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Jeff, I am not in the area any longer, am not a member of WKPP and in now way involved with this matter. With that said a few questions remain. First and foremost what is your relationship with Divers Supply and the charter operator. Just because you compiled this report (or had a hand in compiling it) does not mean it should be taken as gospel. Second, the survivor's comments in this matter are to be viewed as HIGHLY suspect as he may or may not have something to hide. This "Official Press Release" is just that, a press release. Calling an opinion or observation a "fact" does not make it a fact. Had others on site witnessed the events and survived their observations may have been very different and contradicted the statements of Mr. Roth. Third why was this dive conducted without some form of redundant / inadequate flotation. In the "Official Press Release" you and / or others state that steel 72s or 80s were used. My experiences from Broward Co. Florida tells me that a diver using dual lp steel 95s and two lp steel 72s as stage bottles is grossly over weighted when diving wet!!! Who is responsible for this??? My trimix instructor would never have allowed that situation to exist without redundant flotation!!! Other gear concerns aside, why was so much "travel gas" and deco gas needed for the dive plan outlined? Just as a FYI: If I were planing the dive I would not use a travel gas. Bottom gas of 16/50 trimix from surface to bottom and back to 130', switch to EAN32, then to 30' and switch to EAN84. With .5min deep stops on bottom mix at 210' and 170' then 1min stops from 130' through 50', 5min @40', 6min @ 30', 9min @ 20', and 20min @ 10'. Total deco 50min, total run time including deep stops and travel 76min. I have done this type of profile with NO problem (in fact I feel better after this profile then after the longer profile in your post). Forth from the information you presented this class was being conducted out of standards. A 17% mix at 250' gives a 1.47PpO2. for the bottom mix. If memory serves me IANTD limits PpO2 for bottom gas to 1.40 ata. Therefore, the dive was NOT "in compliance with IANTD (International Association Nitrox and Technical Divers) standards". And the "facts" presented in the "press release" are FALSE!!! The gas choice for this profile is suspect at best. What we know for fact from this incident (note: I don't call it an accident. That is yet to be determined.) is that: 1) Three divers are dead 2) Buoyancy problems due to lack of redundancy IS a contributing factor 3) Poor choices with respect to tank selection MAY have added to the buoyancy problems. 4) The true "FACTS" may never be known From what IS known the instructor was responsible for this incident by not following the standards of IANTD and the "diving community". A few key elements of the "Official Press Release" make this painfully clear!!! I'm sure that I am not the only one on this list smart enough to figure this out. I can't wait to how you explain this away to those waiting in the wings to tear into this. At any rate good luck you are going to need it after this admission of guilt!!! At 10:56 AM 1/18/98 -0500, Jeff Hirschman wrote: >For the people who would like to know the real truth.... Here it is.... And >I'm sorry if the facts don't agree with the fantasies of others. > > > >Official Press Release >of >Divers Supply >Compiled by: Jeff Hirschman, Dick McNatt, Renee LaChapelle, >Larry Roth, and Captain Ed Cooke > >January 18, 1997 > >This report was compiled from all the known facts as it pertains to the >accident which >occurred on January 12, 1998 that involved Andre B. Smith, John S. Claypool, >and Mike >J. Elkins. There is no speculation or exaggeration in this report. Only >the facts as known >to us will be conferred in this report. > >Dive team consisted of: >Andre B. Smith, 57 over 10,300+ logged dives. 35+ years experience in >military, > commercial, sport, and technical diving. Instructor trainer who was > qualified to teach novice through the top levels of technical diving. > >John S. Claypool, 34 Experienced in sport, technical, and law enforcement >diving. > Instructor qualified to teach novice through advanced nitrox. > >Mike J. Elkins, 36 Experienced in sport and technical diving, pursuing >further training > in order to improve his skills and capabilities. > >Larry J. Roth, 42 Experienced in military, sport, and technical diving. > 29+ years experience. > >Dive Plan: >This was to be the second trimix dive in Elkins class. The plan called for >a dive on a sandy >bottom to a depth of 250 fsw (feet sea water)with a bottom time of 20 >minutes - gas supply >permitting. All divers were configured with a trimix consisting of 17% >Oxygen, 38% >Helium, and 45% Nitrogen which was contained in twin low pressure steel 95 >cubic foot >tanks with an isolation manifold system. The travel gas, a 40% Nitrox (40% >Oxygen, 60% >Nitrogen) mix was contained in a single low pressure 72 or 80 cubic foot >scuba tank >mounted on the left side of the divers harness. The decompression gas, a >80% Nitrox >(80% oxygen, 20% Nitrogen) mix was contained in a single low pressure 72 or >80 cubic >foot scuba tank and was mounted on the right side of the divers harness. >Additionally, two >72 cubic foot decompression bottles (Nitrox 80%) and one 72 cubic foot >travel gas (Nitrox >40%) were ready aboard the vessel if needed. All equipment and redundant >configurations >were in compliance with IANTD (International Association Nitrox and >Technical Divers) >standards. > > >Dive Profile: >The decompression schedule was planned for *100fsw/1min 90fsw/1min 80fsw/1min >70fsw/3min 60fsw/2min 50fsw/5min 40fsw/6min **30fsw/8min 20fsw/13min >10fsw/28min Backup plan (if Nitrox-80 lost) 30fsw/10min 20fsw/19 10fsw/45 > >*Switch to Nitrox 40% **Switch to Nitrox 80% > >Eyewitness account of surviving team member: >On 12 January 1998, I was a member of the dive team consisting of Andre Smith- >IANTD Trimix Instructor, Mike Elkins- IANTD Technical Nitrox Certified >Diver, John >Claypool- IANTD Trimix Certified Diver and myself- IANTD Trimix Certified >Diver. >The team's goal was to make a discovery dive in the area of the "Classic >Barges" off the >coast of West Palm Beach, Florida. Additionally, Mike Elkins was making the >second >trimix dive of his IANTD Trimix certification program as Andre's student. >Futaba Elkins >was also aboard as a Technical Nitrox student of Andre's and our safety >diver. The boat >used for the dive was the SS Minnow operated by Captain Ed Cooke. Due to >the speed >with which events unfolded and the difficulties experienced, this is my best >recollection of >the entire incident. > >A dive plan was worked out by Mike and myself separately, then compared and >approved, >by Andre. The plan was for a 250 fsw dive for 20 minutes bottom time, 68 >minutes >decompression for a total run time of 99 minutes surface to surface. All >diver's gas >consumption rates allowed for safe completion of the planned dive. Gases >were planned >for 17/38/45 bottom mix, 40% nitrox travel mix, and 80% decompression mix. >All gases >were mixed and verified in the West Palm Beach Diver's Supply store by Andre >and each >respective diver . > >Gear preparation was completed aboard the Minnow without problem, followed >by a dive >briefing. The brief consisted of the dive plan, surface and decompression >plan, and >emergency procedures. Every member of the team fully understood the plan >and executed >it correctly. > >All divers entered the water and descended normally. Bottom conditions were >approximately 1/4 kt north current, 60 ft visibility. A slow drift dive was >started with all >divers remaining in close proximity. During this portion of the dive Mike >was having >difficulty with his buoyancy trim and was kicking vigorously to stay off the >bottom. He >appeared to be struggling, so I went up to him and encouraged him to add >more air to his >buoyancy compensator, then raised the back of his tanks to help shift any >trapped air and >improve his trim. He waved me off and appeared to relax some. I stayed >right next to him >and we continued to drift until we stopped a few moments later to inspect >some concrete >rubble. > >At this time Mike signaled to Andre that he was at his bottom mix turn limit. >(Approximately 15 minutes into the dive.) We then assumed our ascent >positions . I was >on Andre's right, John on his left and Mike on John's left. Andre released >the first liftbag >as planned and we started to ascend. After rising to about 200 fsw, we >started to sink and >Mike appeared to be having trouble adding and/or venting air from his buoyancy >compensator. Andre assisted Mike and we started to go up again and rose to >about 175 >fsw. Mike was still experiencing buoyancy problems and possibly perceived >he was >running out of air. We started to descend again and my view was obscured by >all the >bubbles rising up to my face. Before I could determine were the air was >coming from, we >descended to about 220 fsw. Andre handed me the buoy line to keep it clear >of us while >he devoted his attention to Mike. The liftbag deflated sometime during this >descent. >Andre began to quickly pull it down to use to pull Mike up. John, now too >away far to >assist, had begun his own ascent and I had my first opportunity to get in >front of Mike to >assist him. He was beginning to panic and may have exhausted his bottom >gas. Before I >could get to him with my octopus, Mike began breathing off his travel mix. >Due to the >great depth and high partial pressure of oxygen in the mixture he was now >breathing, his >"central nervous system oxygen toxicity" level was dangerously high as was >the chance of >oxygen induced convulsions. I grabbed Mike by the tank manifold and inflated my >buoyancy compensator (vest) fully to try and drag both Mike and Andre to the >100 fsw >level where we could more safely handle the problem. We got to >approximately 150 fsw, >when I felt a shudder in my hand. I was hoping Andre was shaking Mike >instead of the >onset of his convulsions. When I looked down Mike was not moving. I now >ran out of >air, stopped swimming and tried to get Andre's attention for air or to >signal him to meet >me up higher. Andre may have been trying to share his own air supply with >Mike, but my >view was blocked. We had now sunk back down to180 fsw at which point I lost >my hold >while trying to get around Mike to Andre. Since my buoyancy compensator was >fully >inflated I could not stay with them. > >While I was trying to control my ascent, I saw John above me and attempted >to join him. >He had his liftbag out and was preparing to inflate it. I caught up to him >but could not stop >my rate of ascent until 80 fsw. I looked down and saw John, he still >appeared fine. I then >began to descend down to my first decompression stop at 100 fsw. While >stabilizing >myself I lost sight of John. > >Since I was now alone, I deployed my liftbag and began my decompression >schedule while >I tried to determine how best to modify it, in view of the problems. I >tried to signal the >boat with my bag while I looked for the others. Later I heard a boat >engine revving at high >RPM. I hoped the others had surfaced and were heading for the beach. After >about 30 >minutes a boat drifted up to me and then moved out of my view. Later I saw >another boat, >that stayed with me. It pulled up on top of me and I then knew it was the >Minnow. I >finished my new decompression schedule and surfaced after 125 minutes. > >Once onboard, I found none of the other divers onboard and briefed the >Captain on the >situation. Captain Cooke told me that Andre's liftbag had come up before >mine, but no >one was with it. There was only about 90 minutes of daylight left, so I >suggested we >request a USCG helicopter and then helped Captain Cooke organize a search >pattern to >find the lost divers. Search conditions were excellent and the sea state >low. The Coast >Guard data marker beacons (DMB) were easily visible on the surface, making the >probability of finding a surfaced diver very high. We searched until 0400 >the next day, >returning only once to refuel. USCG assets joined immediately and searched >through >January 15th and Sheriffs department through January 16th. > > >Conclusion: >A search was attempted on the bottom of the accident site on Thursday, >January 15th but >was aborted due to weather conditions. An extensive search was conducted on >the bottom >of the accident site on Saturday, January 17th. The teams consisted of: >1) RV Ocean Window (561) 252-2526 >2) Captain Ed Cooke of the SS Minnow with > Trimix Divers: Jeff Hirschman, Renee LaChapelle, and Mike Haverstock > Safety Divers: Major R.T. Keegan, Sergeant G. Webb, and Officer D. Howard > 2nd Support Team: Larry Roth, Pete Winston, Douglas Frederick > >Results of the surface and bottom searches: >There were no discoveries or recoveries made. > >We would like to thank the following groups and individuals for all of their >help in this >tragic event: > USCG Station Lake Worth > Helo Golf November > Captain Bob Johnson of Rampage Dive Charters > Palm Beach Sheriffs Department - Dive teams, boat crews, and air search units > RV Ocean Window (561) 252-2526 > West Palm Police Department and dive team > Captain Ed Cooke of SS Minnow > And all of those who have gone out of their way to help >-- >Jeff Hirschman > >-- >Send mail for the `techdiver' mailing list to `techdiver@aquanaut.com'. >Send subscribe/unsubscribe requests to `techdiver-request@aquanaut.com'. > > Bill (aquadart) Bott -- Send mail for the `techdiver' mailing list to `techdiver@aquanaut.com'. Send subscribe/unsubscribe requests to `techdiver-request@aquanaut.com'.
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